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COMMENTS 
Standing To Appeal Zoning Determinations: The 
"Aggrieved Person" Requirement 
During the twentieth century the states have increasingly uti-
lized their police power to control the use of land.1 All fifty states 
have now enacted zoning enabling legislation,2 much of which is 
based in whole or in part on the Standard State Zoning Enabling 
Act. 3 Typically, these zoning acts, iike the Standard Act, empower 
municipalities4 to promulgate land use regulations by dividing the 
municipality "into districts of such number, shape, and area as may 
be deemed best suited to carry out the purposes of this act ... ,"Ii 
Most zoning acts specify that "all such regulations shall be uniform 
for each class or kind of buildings throughout each district, but the 
regulations in one district may differ from those in 'other districts."0 
Despite the desire for uniform land regulation, however, a num-
ber of "safety valves" have been incorporated into zoning procedures 
to provide for necessary diversity and to ensure fairness in the 
implementation of zoning regulations.7 One of the most important 
of these is the "board of_adjustment,"8 which has the power to grant 
1. See, e,g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 2'12 U.S. 365 (1926); City of 
Aurora v. Burns, 319 Ill. 84, 149 N.E. '784 (1925); cf. Brandon v. Board of Comm'rs, 124 
N.J.L. 135, 142-43, 11 A.2d 304, 309 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 125 N.J.L. 36'7, 15 A.2d 598 (Ct, 
Err. &: App. 1940). 
2. See Cunningham, Land-Use Control-The State and Local Programs, 50 IOWA L. 
REv. 36'7, 369 n.3 (1965). 
3. The STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING Am: (hereinafter cited as STANDARD Acr) 
was sponsored by the United States Department of Commerce. Originally published in 
1924, it is now out of print, but is reproduced at 3 RATHKOPF, ZONING AND PLANNING 
100-1 to -6 (3d ed. 1956). 
4. Over half the states also authorize counties or townships to enact zoning regula• 
tions. See, e.g., MICH, CoMP. LAws §§ 125.201-.232, 125.2'11-.301 (1948), as amended, 
MICH. COMP. LAws §§ 125.201-.218, 125.2'72-.298 (Supp. 1961). 
5. STANDARD Acr § 2. See, e,g., ALAsKA STAT, ANN. § 29.10.219 (1962); IOWA CODE 
ANN. § 414.2 (1949). 
6. STANDARD Act § 2. (Emphasis added.) See, e,g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9-461C 
(1956); KY. REv. STAT.§ 100.06'7(2) (1962). 
'l. See V. F. Zahodiakin Eng'r Corp. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 8 N.J. 386, 86 
A.2d 12'1 (1952); Guenther v. Zoning Bd. of Review, 85 R.I. 3'7, 125 A,2d 214 (1956); 
Azalea Corp. v. City of Richmond, 201 Va. 636, II2 S.E.2d 862 (1960). 
8. See STANDARD Am: § 7; ARK. STAT. ANN, § 19-2816 (1956); GA. CODE ANN. § 69-815 
(1957). Some statutes refer to this body as the Board of Appeals. See Van Auken 
v. Kimmey, 141 Misc. 105, 252 N.Y.S. 329 (Sup. Ct. 1930). Others title it the Zoning 
Board of Review. See Buckminster v. Zoning Bd. of Review, 69 R.I. 396, 33 A.2d 199 
(1943). 
For the general functions of such boards, see 2 RATHKOPF, op. cit. supra note 3, at 
3'7-1 to -12. See also Anderson, The Board of Zoning Appeals-Villain or Victim1, 13 
SYRACUSE L. REv. 353 (1962); Dukeminier &: Stapleton, The Zoning Board of Adjustment: 
A Case Study in Misrule, 50 KY. L.J. 273 (1962); McSwain, The Zoning Board of 
Adjustment, 13 BAYLOR L. REv. 21 (1961); Souter, Zoning Appeals-How a Board of 
Zoning Appeals Functions, Mich. S.B.J., May 1961, p. 26. 
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such "variance from the terms of the ordinance as will not be con-
trary to the public interest, where, owing to special conditions, a 
literal enforcement of the provisions of the ordinance will result 
in unnecessary hardship, and so that the spirit of the ordinance shall 
be observed and substantial justice done.''9 Moreover, in appropriate 
cases the board may make special exceptions to the terms of a zoning 
ordinance.10 
Before an individual can obtain a variance or special exception, 
he must first apply for a permit from a building inspector to under-
take the desired action. Since the building inspector has no power 
to grant a variance, this preliminary requirement appears unneces-
sary when it is clear that the contemplated use is outside the standards 
of the ordinance; the inspector can issue a permit only if he finds 
that the contemplated land use is in fact permitted by the terms of 
the ordinance.11 
If the building permit is denied for any reason, the applicant 
generally has the right to appeal to the board of adjustment as a 
"person aggrieved ... by any decision of the administrative officer.''12 
The board is then required to hold hearings on the denial of the 
permit and to determine whether a variance should be granted. 
If the requested variance is denied by the board, the applicant 
may appeal, as a person aggrieved, to a proper court.13 On the 
other hand, if the variance is granted by the board, third par-
ties may qualify as persons aggrieved and may litigate the issue 
in court.14 "Aggrieved person," however, is not defined by the 
statutes. Consequently, it has been left to the courts to delineate 
the standards which govern the status of an applicant or a third party 
as an aggrieved person entitled to appeal. It is the purpose of this 
discussion to examine the requirements for applicants and for third 
parties to have standing as persons aggrieved by decisions of the 
9. E.g., STANDARD Acr § 7; NEV. REV. STAT. § 278.290(l)(C) (1963). In some states the 
power to grant variances may be given to the local governing body. See Dallstream and 
Hunt, Variations, Exceptions and Spedal Uses, 1954- U. ILL. L.F. 213. 
10. E.g., STANDARD Acr § 7; TENN. CODE ANN. § 13-706 (1955). For the distinction 
between a variance and an exception or a special use permit, see Devereux Founda-
tion, Inc., 351 Pa. 4-78, 483-86, 200 Atl. !H7, 521 (1945). · 
11. See, e.g., City of Yuba City v. Chemivasky, 117 Cal. App. 568, 4 P.2d 299 (1931); 
Jennings v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., 140 Conn. 650, 103 A.2d 535 (1954); Board-
walk & Seashore Corp. v. Murdock, 175 Misc. 208, 22 N.Y.S.2d 611 (Sup. Ct. 1940). 
12. STANDARD Acr § 7. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 176.11 (194-3); N.Y. VILLAGE LAw 
§ 179-b. A number of statutes specifically provide for an appeal to the board by "any 
person aggrieved by his inability to obtain a building permit." E.g., NEV. REV. STAT. 
§ 278.310(l)(a) (1931); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 5230 (1956). Thus, in most states, ap-
peals to the board are generally based on the refusal of a building inspector to issue 
a permit. See Kelley v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 126 Conn. 648, 650, 13 A.2d 675, 
676 (1940). 
13. See, e.g., STANDARD Acr § 7; N.Y. VILLAGE LAw § 179-b. 
14. See STANDARD Acr § 7. 
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administrative officer and the board of adjustment,15 and to consider 
the validity of some of the factors that have been emphasized by the 
courts in-resolving the issue. 
I. PERMIT .APPLICANTS AS AGGRIEVED PERSONS 
In general, the courts have not provided meaningful indicia 
as to the degree or kind of interest that an applicant must have to 
qualify as an aggrieved person. This judicial vagueness can be 
attributed in part to the fact that variance appeals are generally 
concerned solely with the basis of the denial; the standing of the 
appellants is assumed to be proper. When the standing issue is 
raised, however, it appears that two principal factors are relied 
upon to determine whether an applicant is a person aggrieved. 
First, the appellant must show some substantial legal or equitable 
incident of "ownership" in the property in question; second, he must 
show a significant economic interest in the outcome of the variance 
proceeding.16 
In a majority of the decisions, it is the "legal or equitable interest" 
factor that has received primary consideration. In fact, most courts 
have held that even though a substantial economic interest is mani-
fest, a party lacking a cognizable legal interest cannot be considered 
"aggrieved."17 It would seem, however, that economic factors should 
be given greater stress, especially in circumstances where the legal 
or equitable interest in the property is slight but the outcome of 
the litigation may have substantial economic effects. On the other 
hand, if a person has no interest in the property, he will not and 
should not be granted status as an aggrieved party.18 
The effect of the two factors-legal and economic-<:an best be 
illustrated by a consideration of the various situations in which an 
applicant may become an aggrieved party. The problem arises, of 
course, when the possessor of some interest in the property in ques-
tion applies for a permit or a variance and it is denied.19 
15. The requirements for being aggrieved by decisions of the zoning board of 
adjustment or by the zoning officer overlap with, but are not identical to, the require-
ments for being aggrieved by local legislative action through enactment or amendment 
of the ordinance. The latter issue is not dealt with as such by this discussion, although 
the question is present in a few of the cases cited. 
16. A few courts, however, adopt neither a legal nor an economic analysis. Instead, 
any applicant who is refused a permit is automatically "aggrieved." See Smith v. Sel• 
ligman, 270 Ky. 69, 109 S.W.2d 14 (1937); Buckminster v. Zoning Bd. of Review, 68 
R.I. 515, 30 A.2d 104 (1943). 
17. See, e.g., Chad Homes, Inc. v. Board of Appeals, 5 Misc. 2d 20, 159 N.Y.S.2d 388 
(Sup. Ct. !957); Kumowski v. Boar~ of Zoning Appeals, 53 Lack, Jur. 53 (Pa. C.P. 1952). 
18. Krieger v, Scott, 4 N.J. Misc. 942, 134 Atl. 901 (Sup. Ct. 1926) (per curiam); 
Dimitri v. Zoning Bd. of Review, 61 RJ. 325, 200 Atl. 963 (1938). 
19. It is possible for an applicant to become aggrieved upon the approval of a 
variance. This occurs when the board grants the variance but attaches objectionable 
conditions. See Rand v. City of New York, 3 Misc. 2d 769, 155 N.Y.S.2d 753 (Sup. Ct. 
1956). 
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A. Property Owners 
One who owns property outright and is denied a permit or 
variance clearly has standing to appeal, since fee ownership carries 
with it the highest degree of both legal and economic implications. 
Indeed, the rule granting a property owner standing is so well 
established that few direct statements have been enunciated on this 
point. The major support for the rule comes from decisions that a 
person is a property owner and an aggrieved party,20 or inferentially 
from cases allowing appeals by an agent of the owner or by a pros-
pective vendee.21 For example, in Dunham v. Zoning Bd.22 the court 
ruled that it was unnecessary to decide whether a conditional vendee 
had a sufficient interest in the property to apply for a special excep-
tion, since "the application in question was also made, signed and 
prosecuted personally before the board by the owner of the land 
whose right under the ordinance to apply for such an exception is 
not questioned."23 
B. Agents of Property Owner 
An application of ordinary rules of agency would seem to require 
that an agent be held to possess, for the purpose of determining 
standing, whatever interest his principal has in the property. Al-
though few courts have ruled directly on the question, it seems clear 
that an agent of the fee owner may be an aggrieved party. For 
example, it has been held that a construction company24 or an 
architect25 may appeal in the capacity of "agent for the owner," and 
other courts have viewed successors in interest during the pendency 
of the application26 or conditional vendees27 as persons aggrieved. 
Generally, the courts have found the requisite interests on the 
theory that the party in question is an implied agent of the 
owner. Furthermore, at least one court has held a "straw man" 
to be a person aggrieved, on the theory that he was a fiduciary for 
the true owner.28 It would appear, therefore, that standing to appeal 
should be granted to an agent whenever his principal, whether 
or not he is the outright owner of the property, could himself 
qualify as an aggrieved party. 
20. See, e.g., Scholl v. Yeadon .Borough, 148 Pa. Super. 601, 26 A.2d 135 (1942). 
21. See cases cited notes 24-28, 34-41 infra. 
22. 68 R.I. 88, 26 A.2d 614 (1942). 
23. Id. at 92, 26 A.2d at 616. 
24. Stout v. Jenkins, 268 S.W.2d 643 (Ky. 1954). 
25. Protomastro v • .Board of Adjustment, 3 N.J. Super. 539, 67 A.2d 231 (Super. Ct. 
L. 1949), rev'd on other grounds, 3 N.J. 494, 70 A.2d 873 (1950). 
26. Feneck v. Murdock, 16 Misc. 2d 789, 181 N.Y.S.2d 441 (Sup. Ct. 1958). 
27. Arant v. .Board of Adjustment, 271 Ala. 600, 126 So. 2d 100 (1960); Slater 
v. Toohill, 276 App. Div. 850, 93 N.Y.S.2d 153 (1949) (memorandum decision); Hickox 
v. Griffin, 274 App. Div. 792, 79 N.Y.S.2d 193 (1948), rev'd on other grounds, 298 N.Y. 
365, 83 N.E.2d 836 (1949). · 
28. Dion v • .Board of Appeals, 344 Mass. 547, 183 N.E.2d 479 (1962). 
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C. Lessees 
In Nicholson v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment,29 the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court pointed out that a tenant occupies "a status which 
permits him to apply for a variance and ... he is a 'party aggrieved' 
within the meaning of that term as used in the Enabling Acts and 
ordinances enacted pursuant to them."80 The implication of the 
Nicholson case is that a tenant or lessee always has sufficient eco-
nomic and legal interests in the property to qualify as an aggrieved 
party. While Nicholson represents the majority view,81 a few cases 
have come to the contrary conclusion. Thus, it has been held that 
if a lessee's interest is based on an oral lease,82 or a tenancy at will,33 
he cannot be granted standing. The validity of such distinctions is 
doubtful, because the degree of legal interest in a leasehold is the 
same regardless of whether it is based upon an oral contract, a written 
contract, a tenancy at will, or a tenancy for a definite period. More-
over, the economic interest in the leasehold does not depend upon 
the type of contract employed. Even where the lessee under an 
oral lease is viewed as holding a de minimis legal property interest, 
it does not necessarily follow that he has an insubstantial economic 
interest in the property. Consequently, if substantial fairness is to be 
maintained in the administration of zoning regulations, it would 
seem better to allow a tenant to appeal an adverse ruling whenever 
he has an overriding economic interest in the outcome of the vari-
ance application. Thus, the length of the unexpired term of the 
lease should be considered as a factor, although not a conclusive 
one, in the determination of the lessee's standing. As a result, even 
a written lease might not support the lessee's standing to appeal if 
it had only a short time to run and no renewal option. · 
D. Contract Vendees 
The courts have had difficulty in determining whether a pur-
chaser under a contract should be granted status as an aggrieved 
person. In general, it appears that the judiciary will not look through 
the form of the contract to examine the real interests involved in 
the appeal. If the contract is unconditional, the vendee will be 
29. 392 Pa. 278, 140 A.2d 604 (1958). 
30. Id. at 282, 140 A.2d at 606. 
31. See, e.g., Poster Advenising Co. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 408 Pa. 248, 182 
A.2d 521 (1962); Richman v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 391 Pa. 254, 137 A.2d 280 
(1958); Ralston Purina Co. v. Zoning Bd., 64 R.I. 197, 12 A.2d 219 (1940). 
A cotenant may attack the validity of a zoning ordinance in his own behalf. Jones 
v. Incorporated Village of Lloyd Harbor, 277 App. Div. 1124, 100 N.Y.S.2d 948 (1950), 
afj'd mem., 302 N.Y. 718, 98 N.E.2d 589 (1951). 
32. In re McLaughlin, 42 Del. Co. 388 (Pa. C.P. 1955). See also Bloom v. Wides, 
164 Ohio St. 138, 128 N.E.2d 31 (1955). 
33. Gallagher v. Zoning Bd. of Review, 186 A.2d 325 (R.I. 1962), See also City of 
Little Rock v. Goodman, 222 Ark. 350, 260 S.W .2d 450 (1953). 
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granted standing.34 When the contract is conditioned upon the se-
curing of a zoning variance or exception, however, the purchaser's 
qualifications are not as clear. In the majority of cases the courts have 
allowed such a purchaser to apply for a permit and to appeal a denial 
thereof as an aggrieved party.35 Normally, this result is reached by 
regarding the conditional vendee as the agent or assignee of the 
owner,36 or as an equitable owner.31 On the other hand, a few courts 
have impliedly dropped the "legal or equitable interest" analysis 
and have held that a conditional vendee has a sufficient personal 
economic interest in the property to support his standing to appeal. 38 
For example, the Supreme Court of Ohio has stated that "it is enough 
that an application was made for a permit to use this property for a 
filling station, by one having a contingent interest in using the 
property for that purpose . . . . "39 In addition, several courts have 
used the fact that the owner joined in the application40 or gave his 
consent and approval41 as a makeweight for allowing the conditional 
purchaser to appeal as a person aggrieved. 
In a few decisions the contract vendee has been denied standing 
as an aggrieved party because he did not have a sufficient present 
interest in the property to enable him to seek a use change in the 
34. See, e.g., Goldreyer v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 144 Conn. 641, 136 A.2d 789 
(1957); Sigretto v • .Board of Adjustment, 134 N.J.L. 587, 50 A.2d 492 (Sup. Ct. 1946); 
Mandalay Constr., Inc. v. Zimmer, 22 Misc. 2d 543, 194 N.Y.S.2d 404 (Sup. Ct. 1959); 
Henry Norman Associates, Inc. v. Ketler, 16 Misc. 2d 764, 183 N.Y.S.2d 875 (Sup. Ct. 
1959); Elkins Park Improvement Ass'n Zoning Case, 361 Pa. 322, 64 A.2d 783 (1949); 
Scheer v. Weis, 13 Wis. 2d 408, 108 N.W.2d 523 (1961). 
35. E.g., Arant v. Board of Adjustment, 271 Ala. 600, 126 So. 2d 100 (1960); Reiskin 
v. County Council, 229 Md. 142, 182 A.2d 34 (1962); City of Baltimore v. Cohn, 204 Md. 
523, 105 A.2d 482 (1954); Burr v. Keene, 105 N.H. 228, 196 A.2d 63 (1963). 
36. Arant v. Board of Adjustment, 271 Ala. 600, 126 So. 2d 100 (1960); Wilson 
v. Township Comm., 123 N.J.L. 474, 9 A.2d 771 (Sup. Ct. 1939); Hickox v. Griffin, 274 
App. Div. 792, 79 N.Y.S.2d 193 (1948), rev'd on other grounds, 298 N.Y. 365, 83 N.E.2d 
836 (1949); Colony Park, Inc. v. Malone, 25 Misc. 2d 1072, 205 N.Y.S.2d 166 (Sup. Ct. 
1960); State ex rel. Waltz v. Independence, 69 Ohio L. Abs. 445, 125 N.E.2d 911 (Dist. 
Ct. App. 1952). 
37. Hickox v. Griffin, supra note 36; O'Neill v. Philadelphia Zoning Bd. of Adjust-
ment, 384 Pa. 379, 120 A.2d 901 (1956); Silverco, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 
379 Pa. 497, 109 A.2d 147 (1954). 
38. E.g., City of Baltimore v. Cohn, 204 Md. 523, 105 A.2d 482 (1954); Carson 
v. Board of Appeals, 321 Mass. 649, 75 N.E.2d II6 (1947); Colony Park, Inc. v. Malone, 
25 Misc. 2d 1072, 205 N.Y.S.2d 166 (Sup. Ct. 1960); State ex rel. Sun Oil Co. v. City 
of Euclid, 164 Ohio St. 265, 130 N.E.2d 336 (1955), see State ex rel. River Grove Park, 
Inc. v. City of Kettering, II8 Ohio App. 143, 193 N.E.2d 547 (1962). 
39. State ex rel. Sun Oil Co. v. City of Euclid, supra note 38, at 269, 130 N.E.2d 
at 339. 
40. Marinelli v: Board of Appeal of the Bldg. Dep't, 275 Mass. 169, 175 N.E. 479 
(1931); Colt v. Bernard, 279 S.W.2d 527 (Mo. Ct. App. 1955); Jersey Triangle Corp. 
v. Board of Adjustment, 127 N.J.L. 194, 21 A.2d 845 (Sup. Ct. 1941); State ex rel. Sun 
Oil Co. v. City of Euclid, 164 Ohio St. 265, 130 N.E.2d 336 (1955). 
41. Wilson v. Township Comm., 123 N.JL. 474, 9 A.2d 771 (Sup. Ct. 1939); 
Slamowitz v. Jelleme, 3 N.J. Misc. II69, 130 Atl. 833 (Sup. Ct. 1925); Stoll v. Gulf 
Oil Corp., 79 Ohio L. Abs. 145, 155 N.E.2d 83 (C.P. 1958); Elvan v. Exley, 58 Pa. 
D. &: C. 538 (C.P. 1947). 
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first place; therefore, he could not be aggrieved by the denial of an 
application.42 In addition, some courts which would othenvise grant 
the applicant the status of an appellant distinguish between variance 
applicants and persons applying for other types of permits. Since 
many statutes require an applicant for a variance to show "unneces-
sary hardship,"43 it has been reasoned that a vendee who knowingly 
acquires land with the expectation of using it for a prohibited pur-
pose cannot thereafter apply for a variance, because his 'hardship is 
self~inflicted.44 However, reliance on this distinction seems unwar-
ranted. In the first place, the question of unnecessary hardship should 
not even arise until the merits of the variance application are reached. 
Second, since the owner-vendor clearly has standing as an aggrieved 
party, his vendee should also be entitled to aggrieved-party status. In 
effect, the vendee should be considered as having purchased this im-
portant right as a part of the normal incidents of property ownership. 
A few courts have impliedly adopted this position.415 
E. Option Holders 
Many jurisdictions view the holder of an option to purchase as 
having a mere right of choice granted by his option rather than a 
present legal interest in the property.46 Consequently, the optionee 
of property for which a variance or other use permit is sought and 
refused is generally not regarded as an aggrieved party.47 However, 
some courts, adopting what appears to be the better reasoning,48 
make no distinction between an optionee and a vendee whose con-
tract is conditioned upon the securing of a variance. Since each is 
considered to be acting at least impliedly on behalf of the owner, 
42. E.g., Symonds v. Bucklin, 197 ,F. Supp. 682 (D. Md. 1961); MinQ.cy v. City of 
Azusa, 164 Cal. App. 2d 12, 330 P.2d 255 (1958), appeal dismissed, 359 U.S. 486 (1959); 
see Clark Oil &: Ref. Corp. v. City of Evanston, 23 Ill. 2d 48, 177 N.E.2d 191 (1961). 
Compare Sun Oil Co. v. Macauley, '72 R.I. 206, 49 A.2d 917 (1946), with State ex rel. 
River Grove Park, Inc. v. City of Kettering, 118 Ohio App. 143, 193 N.E.2d 547 (1962). 
43. See, e.g., STANDARD Am: § 7; KY. REv. STAT • .ANN. § 100.076 (1962) (cxccp• 
tional situations or conditions); N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 179-b. 
44. See Clark v. :Board of Zoning Appeals, 301 N.Y. 86, 92 N.E.2d 903 (1950), cert. 
denied, 340 U.S. 933 (1951); People ex rel. Fordham Manor Reformed Church v. Walsh, 
244 N.Y. 280, 155 N.E. 575 (1927); MCJ.'lichol v. Gallagher, ~ Pa. D. &: C. 338 (C.P. 1948). 
45. See, e.g., Slater v. Toohill, 276 App. Div. 850, 93 N.Y.S.2d 153 (1949) (memo• 
randum decision); Hickox v. Griffin, 274 App. Div. 972, 79 N.Y.S.2d 193 (1948), rev'd 
on other grounds, 298 N.Y. 365, 83 N.E.2d 836 (1949). Sec also Gray v. Board of 
Supervisors, 154 Cal. App. 2d 700, 316 P.2d 678 (1957) (permit for church erection); 
City of Baltimore v. Cohn, 204 Md. 523, 105 A.2d 482 (1954) (special exception); 
O'Neill v. Philadelphia Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 384 Pa. 379, 120 A.2d 901 '(1956) 
(permit for dancing school). 
46. Lee v. Board of Adjustment, 226 N.C. 107, 37 S.E,2d 128 (1946); sec Parise 
v. Zoning Bd, of Review, 92 R.I. 338, 168 A.2d 476 (1961). 
47. See, e.g., Parise v. Zoning Bd. of Review, supra note 46; Tripp v. Zoning Dd, 
of Review, 84 R.I. 262, 123 A.2d 144 (1956). See also First Nat'l Bank &: Trust Co. 
v. City of Evanston, 53 Ill. App. 2d 321, 203 N.E.2d 6 (1964). 
48. See 2 RATHKOl'F, op. cit. supra note 3, at 40-6. 
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both qualify as aggrieved parties whenever the owner could so 
qualify.49 In any case, the decisions on point all indicate that if the 
legal owner joins in the original application, the holder of an option 
on the property will be allowed to appeal from a denial of the 
application. 50 
F. Others 
As previously stated, 51 if both the legal and economic interests 
of a person in the property in question are lacking or ambiguous, 
standing to appeal as an aggrieved party will generally be denied. 
The courts vary, however, in the strictness of their attitude toward 
the requirement of the presence of both factors. Standing to appeal 
has been refused, for example, when an airplane club applied for a 
variance to permit the operation of an airfield on property in which 
it had no title or interest, 52 and when a theatrical group sought a 
variance for land on which it merely intended to submit a bid.53 
Apparently, courts denying standing to appeal in such situations re-
quire the prospective appellant to have not only an economic inter-
est in the property but also a legal or equitable interest. 
On the other hand, a few courts seem to have placed less weight 
on the property interest and have relied more extensively on eco-
nomic considerations. For instance, in one case an insurance com-
pany was allowed to appeal to the board from a denial of a repair 
permit to the owner, where the building had been damaged and 
the denial of the permit made th~ insurer liable for a constructive 
total loss.54 Looking at the economic impact upon the insurance 
company of the denial of the repair permit, the court held that a" 
decision which had the effect of increasing the company's liability 
qualified it as an aggrieved party. 55 Another recent decision allowed 
a non-owner to apply for rezoning of a lot upon which he intended 
to construct an office building.56 
49. See Babitzke v. Village of Harvester, 32 Ill. App. 2d 289, 177 N.E.2d 644 (1961); 
Hatch v. Fiscal Court, 242 S.W.2d 1018 (Ky. 1961); Smith v. Selligman, 270 Ky. 69, 
109 S.W.2d 14 (1937). But see Arant v. Board of Adjustment, 271 Ala. 600, 126 So. 2d 
100 (1960); Conery v. City of Nashua, 103 N.H. 16, 164 A.2d 247 (1960). 
50. See, e.g., Cranston Jewish Center v. Zoning Bd. of Review, 93 R.I. 364, 175 A.2d 
296 (1961); Dunham v. Zoning Bd., 68 R.I. 88, 26 A.2d 438 (1942): cf. Hickerson 
v. Flannery, 42 Tenn. App. 329, 302 S.W .2d 508 (1956). 
51. See text accompanying notes 17-18 supra. 
52. Underhill v. Board of Appeals, 17 Misc. 2d 257, 72 N.Y.S.2d 588 (Sup. Ct.), 
aff'd, 273 App. Div. 788, 75 N.Y.S.2d 327 (1947), aff'd mem., 297 N.Y. 937, 80 N.E.2d 
342 (1948). 
53. Schaeffer Appeal, 7 Pa. D. &: C.2d 468 (C.P. 1956). 
54. State ex rel. Home Ins. Co. v. Burt, 23 Wis. 2d 231, 127 N.W.2d 270 (1964). 
55. "Under the facts of the instant action, the insurers stand to lose over $21,000 
as a result of the ruling of the board, which has the effect of turning a $6,337.04 
partial loss into a constructive total loss, requiring the insurers to pay $28,000, the full 
amount of the policies. The city's contentions on this point are without merit, for the 
insurance companies are clearly 'persons aggrieved' •••• " Id. at 238, 127 N.W.2d at 273. 
56. Binford v. Western Elec. Co., 219 Ga. 404, 133 S.E.2d 361 (1963). 
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In the majority of cases, however, the courts will still strive to 
find some legal or equitable interest even when there are compelling 
economic considerations in the particular circumstances of the case. 
Thus, standing to appeal has been granted where it appears, other 
than from the record, that the appellant already is or intends to be-
come the owner of the property.57 Moreover, if the owner originally 
joined in the application, an appeal may be allowed by a person 
who could not himself qualify as aggrieved.58 In Feneck v. Murdock/19 
for example, a corporation which had applied for a variance was 
subsequently dissolved pending the hearing before the board. Never-
theless, the principal stockholders were allowed to continue the 
application. 60 
It would appear, therefore, that many courts have accorded 
"aggrieved party" status to individuals who would not normally be 
regarded as possessing substantial attributes of a legal interest in the 
property in question. However, it is incumbent upon the appealing 
party to plead the special facts of his particular situation if he is 
not the legal owner of the property involved in the application. 
II. THIRD PARTIES AS PERSONS AGGRIEVED 
When a board of adjustment grants a variance, the applicant gen-
erally would have no reason to appeal to a court. 61 However, the 
result may be objectionable to persons other than the applicant. 
Third parties will be permitted to appeal to the courts as persons 
aggrieved62 if they can "show that ... [their] property will suffer 
some special damages as a result of the decision of the board com-
plained of, which is not common to other property owners similarly 
57. See, e.g., Board of Zoning Appeals v. Moyer, 108 Ind. App. 198, 'l!1 N.E.2d 905 
(1940); Tramonti v. Zoning Bd. of Review, 93 Rl. 131, 172 A,2d 93 (1961). 
58. See Marinelli v. Board of Appeal of the Bldg. Dep't, 275 Mass. 169, 175 N.E. 
479 (1931) (conditional vendee); Jersey Triangle Corp. v. Board of Adjustment, 127 
N.J.L. 194, 21 A.2d 845 (Sup. Ct. 1941) (conditional vendee); cf. Taxpayers' Ass'n 
v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 301 N.Y. 215, 93 N.E.2d 645 (1950) (property owners' 
association). 
59. 16 Misc. 2d 789, 181 N.Y.S.2d 441 (Sup. Ct. 1958). 
60. The corporation was held to be the agent of its stockholders; when it applied 
for a variance and conveyed the land to its principals, the variance ran with the land, 
See id. at 792, 181 N.Y.S.2d at 445. 
61. Cf. note 19 supra. 
62. Many courts define persons aggrieved as including landowners or residents 
who are adversely affected. E.g., Jackson's Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 21 Conn. 
Supp. 102, 145 A.2d 241 (C.P. 1958). The breadth of the statutes varies. E.g., KY, REV, 
STAT. ANN. § 100.480 (1962) ("any property owner or tenant'') (cities of 20,000·100,000 
population), § 100.872 ("any person, firm, corporation, organization'') (cities of under 
20,000 population). In Illinois, any property owner not given notice of a variance pro-
ceeding may appeal if he lives within 250 feet of the property in question, ILL, ANN, 
STAT. ch. 24, § 11-13-7 (Smith-Hurd 1962). Many statutes also allow any taxpayer to 
appeal. For the limited effect given some of these provisions, see text accompanying 
notes 102·11 infra. 
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situated."68 Like the standards for an applicant to qualify as a person 
aggrieved, the standards for third parties have never been clearly 
specified. However, it appears that the courts attempt to justify 
the standing of third parties as a necessary counterbalance to 
the standing of applicants. 64 Since zoning statutes almost uni-
formly provide for the inclusion of the general public in hearings 
before the board, 65 it seems logical to assume that these same parties 
should, in some instances, be allowed to have their positions heard 
before a court. Although courts often speak of individual loss as a 
necessary prerequisite to a third party's standing to appeal as a person · 
aggrieved, the actual test employed seems to vary from case to case. 
A. Near by Property Owners 
A nearby landowner normally has standing as an aggrieved person. 
In fact, one commentator has referred to such property owners as 
private attorneys general asserting the public interest. 66 If the prop-
erty owner's land abuts the land in question, the mere fact of prox-
imity, without further proof of special damage, has often been 
sufficient to support his appeal. 67 I£ he does not abut, however, the 
requirements for standing may be more stringent. 68 It appears that 
a non-abutting property owner must allege both proximity and 
special damage for prima fade status as an aggrieved person.69 To 
satisfy the "special damage" element, the third-party appellant must 
suffer some injury peculiar to his own property ·or more substantial 
63. Victoria Corp. v. Atlanta Merchandise Mart, Inc., 101 Ga. App. 163, 112 S.E.2d 
793, 795 (1960); see Downey v. Incorporated Village of Ardsley, 152 N.Y.S.2d 195 
(Sup. Ct. 1956), afl'd mem., 3 App. Div. 2d 663, 158 N.Y.S.2d 306 (1957). 
64. See generally Krasnowiecki, Planned Unit Development: A Challenge to Estab-
lished Theory and Practice of Land Use Control, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 47, 55-63 (1965); 
cf. BASSEIT, ZONING 154 (1940). 
65. STANDARD Ac:r § 7: "All meetings of the board shall be open to the public." See, 
e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 407 (1959); UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9-8 (1953). 
66. See Krasnowiecki, supra note 64, at 60. 
67. See, e.g., Heady v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 139 Conn. 463, 94 A.2d 789 (1953); 
Elwyn v. City of Miami, 113 So. 2d 849 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959); Hemreich v. Quinn, 
350 Mo. 770, 168 S.W.2d 1054 (1943); Lynch v. Borough of Hillsdale, 136 N.J.L. 129, 
54 A.2d 723 (Sup. Ct. 1947), aff'd per curiam, 137 N.J.L. 280, 59 A.2d 622 (Ct. Err. 
&: App. 1948). But cf. Barnathan v. Garden City Park Water Dist., 21 App. Div. 2d 
832, 251 N.Y.S.2d 706 (1964). 
68. See Heady v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, supra note 67; Call Bond & Mortgage Co. 
v. City of Sioux City, 219 Iowa 572, 259 N.W. 33 (1935); Wright v. DeFatta, 244 La. 
251, 152 So. 2d 10 (1963); Toomey v. Gomeringer, 235 Md. 456, 201 A.2d 842 (1964); 
Spaulding v. Board of Appeals, 334 Mass. 688, 138 N.E.2d 367 (1956); Gerling v. Board . 
of Zoning Appeals, II Misc. 2d 84, 167 N.Y.S.2d 358 (Sup. Ct. 1957); Graves v. Johnson, 
75 S.D. 261, 63 N.W.2d 341 (1954). 
69. See Treadway v. City of Rockford, 24 Ill. 2d 488, 182 N.E.2d 219 (1962); Malena 
v. Commerdinger, 233 N.Y.S.2d 549 (Sup. Ct. 1962); Balsam v. Jagger, 231 N.Y.S.2d 450 
(Sup. Ct. 1962); cf. Wright v. DeFatta, supra note 68, at 264-65, 152 So. 2d at 15, where 
the damage alleged was a depreciation in value, "droves of kids,'' and "Negroes loafing 
on the streets." 
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than that suffered by the community at large.7° For example, an 
increase in traffic as a result of the variance would generally affect 
all owners similarly situated. Under these circumstances, an indi-
vidual would be "aggrieved" only if he could show that his property, 
or his property and that of his immediate neighbors, suffered in-
juries more substantial than those suffered by the general public.71 
Thus, standing will be denied to non-abutting third parties whose 
injury is deemed to be de minimis because the property is too far 
away from the land for which a variance has been granted,72 or if 
the injury suffered is identical to that suffered by the general 
community. 
B. Nonresidents 
Most courts have held that nonresidents cannot challenge zoning 
regulations,73 even if their property is adjacent to the questione.d 
zoning.74 For this reason, it has generally been assumed that a third 
party must reside or own property within the particular community 
to qualify as an aggrieved person.75 Despite this authority, however, 
recent decisions appear to indicate a trend in favor of allowing non-
residents to attack the enactment76 and application77 of zoning ordi-
nances and decisions within the neighboring municipality. 
The Standard Act provides that zoning regulations "shall be made 
in accordance with a comprehensive plan,"78 and the majority of 
current state zoning enabling acts retain this language.70 Since rural 
residence in the United States is declining,80 it has become apparent 
70. See S.A. Lynch Inv. Corp. v. City of Miami, 151 So. 2d 858 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1963); Adams v. The Mayor, 107 N.J.L. 149, 151 Atl. 863 (Ct. Err. &: App. 1930); Schultze 
v. Wilson, 54 N.J. Super. 309, 148 A.2d 852 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1959); Moore 
v. Burchell, 14 App. Div. 2d 572, 218 N.Y.S.2d 868, appeal denied, 10 N.Y.2d 709, 179 
N.E.2d 716, 223 N.Y.S.2d 1026 (1961). 
71. See Victoria Corp. v. Atlanta Merchandise Mart, Inc., 101 Ga. App. 163, 112 
S.E.2d 793 (1960). 
72. See Tyler v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 145 Conn. 655, 145 A.2d 832 (1958) 
(5 miles away); City of Greenbelt v. Jaeger, 237 Md. 456, 206 A.2d 694 (1965) (7½ miles 
away); Marcus v. Montgomery County Council, 235 Md. 535, 201 A.2d 777 (1964) 
(¼ mile away); Lampinski v. Rhode Island Racing &: Athletics Comm'n, 94 R.I. 438, 
181 A.2d 438 (1962) (½ mile away). 
73. E.g., .Browning v. Bryant, 178 Misc. 576, 34 N.Y.S.2d 280 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd mem,, 
264 App. Div. 777, 34 N.Y.S.2d 729 (1942). 
74. E.g., Village of Russell Gardens v. Board of Zoning and Appeals, 30 Misc. 2d 
392, 219 N.Y.S.2d 501 (Sup. Ct. 1961). 
75. See Kamerman v. LeRoy, 133 Conn. 232,237, 50 A.2d 175, 178 (1946); 2 METZEN• 
BAUM, ZONING 1039 (2d ed. 1955); 2 RATHKOPF, ZONING AND PLANNING 40•8 (3d ed. 1956). 
76. See Koppel v. City of Fainvay, 189 Kan. 710, 371 P.2d 113 (1962). 
77. See Hamelin v. Zoning Bd., 19 Conn. Supp. 445, 117 A.2d 86 (C.P. 1955): Borough 
of Leonia v • .Borough of Fort Lee, 56 N.J. Super. 135, 151 A.2d 540 (Super. Ct, App, 
Div. 1959). 
78. STANDARD Acr § 3. 
79. Fewer than ten states lack provisions for zoning regulations in accordance with 
a comprehensive plan. See Cunningham, Land-Use Control-The State and Local 
Programs, 50 IowA L. REv. 367, 371 (1965). 
80. In 1960 almost three quarters of the total population of the United States 
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that the impact of zoning is no longer of concern only to the enacting 
municipality. 81 Because zoning may have extraterritorial effects, a few 
courts have interpreted "comprehensive plan" to permit82 or require83 
the taking into consideration of "regional"84 factors when zoning 
ordinances are enacted. In fact, some states have given their cities 
explicit authority to adopt zoning regulations for areas within a 
specified distance outside the city limits.85 Consequently, it would 
seem that such developments will inevitably lead to the granting of 
standing as persons aggrieved to affected nonresidents. A few cases 
illustrate the steps which have already been taken toward this goal. 
In 1949 the New Jersey Supreme Court held: 
[T]he most appropriate use of any particular property depends 
not only on all the conditions, physical, . economic and social, 
prevailing within the municipality and its needs, present and 
reasonably prospective, but also on the nature ·of the entire re-
gion in which the municipality is located and the use to which 
the land in that region has been pr may be put most advanta-
geously. 86 
Subsequently, in Borough of Cresskill v. Borough of Dumont,81 a 
lower New Jersey court held that a borough and its residents had 
standing to challenge an adjoining borough's zoning.88 On appeal, 
the New Jersey Supreme Court found it unnecessary to. decide the 
issue, since a resident of the defendant borough was a party to the 
lived in "urban" areas. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL 
AnsrRAcr OF THE UNITED STATES 15 (86th ed. 1965). 
81. See Haar, Regionalism and Realism in Land-Use Planning, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 
515 (1957); cf. GULICK, THE ME1ROPOLITAN PROBLEM AND AMERICAN IDEAS (1962). 
82. See, e.g., Valley View Village, Inc. v. Proffett, 221 F.2d 412, 418 (6th Cir. 1955) 
("It is obvious that Valley View, Ohio, on the periphery of a large metropolitan center, 
is not such a self-contained community, but only an adventitious fragment of the 
economic and social whole"); Gordon v. City of Wheaton, 12 Ill. 2d 284, 146 N.E.2d 
37 (1957); Schwartz v. Congregation Powolei Zeduck, 8 Ill. App. 2d 438,441, 131 N.E.2d 
785, 786 (App. Div. 1956) ("[I]t is not unreasonable to base zoning regulations for one 
municipality upon the conditions or character of an adjoining municipality."). 
83. See, e.g., Borough of Cresskill v. Borough of Dumont, 15 N.J. 238, 104 A.2d 
441 (1954); Kozesnik v. Township of Montgomery, 24 N.J. 154, 177-78, 131 A.2d 1, 14 
(1957) (dictum); Gartland v. Borough of Maywood, 45 N.J. Super. 1, 6, 131 A.2d 529, 
532 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1957) (dictum). 
84. "Regional" as used here refers to factors inherent in land outside the munici-
pality which must or should be taken into consideration in order to comply with 
the requirements of a "comprehensive plan." This is to be distinguished from the type 
of regional plan put forth by a "regional planning agency." About one-half of the 
states have such agencies. 
85. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 24, § Il-13-1 (Smith-Hurd 1962); Petterson v. City 
of Naperville, 9 Ill. 2d 233, 137 N.E.2d 371 (1956). See also Haar, supra note 81, at 
527-29; Melli &: Devoy, Extraterritorial Planning and Urban Growth, 1959 WIS. L. REv. 
55. 
86. Duffcon Concrete Prods., Inc. v. Borough of Cresskill, I N.J. 509, 513, 64 A.2d 
347, 349-50 (1949). . · 
87. 28 N.J. Super. 26, 100 A.2d 182 (Super. Ct. L. 1953). 
88. Id. at 43, 100 A.2d at 191. 
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proceedings.80 The court pointed out, however, that a municipality 
is required to give consideration to "residents and taxpayers of adjoin-
ing municipalities who may be adversely affected by proposed zoning 
changes."90 A few years later the implications of this favorable atti-
tude toward nonresident standing were confirmed in another New 
Jersey decision in which the court held that the right of a munic-
ipality to challenge the zoning of a contiguous municipality "is not 
questioned."91 
Connecticut courts have also granted a limited right to protest 
the zoning activities of a neighboring municipality. In Hamelin v. 
Zoning B·d.,92 residents of the "town"03 in which the defendant bor-
ough was located sought standing to appeal the borough commission-
ers' orders. The court concluded that those parties who took part in 
a zoning hearing were aggrieved persons, even though they were 
neither residents nor taxpayers of the borough itself.04 
The most liberal extension of nonresident standing in zoning 
cases can be found in a recent\',Kansas decision.05 Under the Kansas 
protest statute, a zoning amendment protested by twenty per cent of 
the fronting landowners can be passed only by a four-fifths vote of 
the city council.96 The Kansas Supreme Court held that nonresident 
landowners with land fronting on the area proposed to be altered 
should have their protests counted toward the twenty per cent ob-
jection requirement.97 Since this decision allows nonresidents to par-
ticipate in the enactment of zoning amendments, it would appear a 
fortiori that adversely affected nonresidents would have standing as 
aggrieved persons to contest the administration of the zoning regu-
lations by the board of adjustment. 
C. Business Competitors 
It is uniformly held that a person who objects to the grant of a 
variance solely on the ground that it will create competition with 
89. 15 N.J. 238, 245, 104 A.2d 441,444 (1954). 
90. Id. at 247, 104 A.2d at 445. 
91. Borough of Leonia v. Borough of Fort Lee, 56 N.J. Super. 135, 139, 151 A.2d 
540, 542 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1959). 
92. 19 Conn. Supp. 445, 117 A.2d 86 (C.P. 1955). 
93. A New England town is roughly equivalent to what is known as a township 
in other parts of the country. 32 MUNICIPAL YEAR BOOK 14 (1965). 
94. 19 Conn. Supp. at 446, 448, 117 A.2d at 86, 87: "While the plaintiffs are resident 
taxpayers of the town, none of them are residents, landowners or taxpayers in the 
borough .... We conclude that the plaintiffs who attended the hearing and took part 
in the proceedings are entitled to have the orders of the borough commission reviewed." 
95. Koppel v. City of Fairway, 189 Kan. 710, 371 P.2d 113 (1962), 
96. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 12-708 (1964). 
97. The four-fifths requirement would have come into play in this case only if the 
nonresident protests were counted; less than 20% of the resident frontage owners 
protested, while 90% of the nonresident frontage owners objected. 
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his business is not "aggrieved."98 An individual cannot be aggrieved 
"merely because a variance, even if improvidently granted, will in-
crease competition in (his] business.''99 Any injury to the competi-
tor's business stemming from the variance is viewed as damnum 
absque injuria. Naturally, a competitor could be "aggrieved" if 
he also had an interest, apart from his business interest, that would 
be adversely affected. For example, a competitor might own residen-
tial property within the zoned area.100 His standing should therefore 
be determined by the usual "special damage" inquiry applicable to 
other third-party appellants.101 
D. Taxpayers 
The Standard Act provides that appeals may be taken from the 
board to the courts by a person aggrieved or by "any taxpayer.''102 
Only seventeen states, however, have retained this language.103 Al-
though such language would seem to imply that any taxpayer may 
appeal without satisfying the requirements for attaining the status 
of a "person aggrieved,"104 only a few courts have so held.105 In most 
of the jurisdictions where the language has been retained, the courts 
have required the taxpayer to show that he was "aggrieved" in some 
manner.106 In other words, he must generally show special damage 
to his property.101 
98. See McDermott v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 150 Conn. 510, 191 A.2d 551 (1963); 
Whitney Theatre Co. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 150 Conn. 285, 189 A.2d 396 (1963); 
Benson v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 129 Conn. 280, 27 A.2d 389 (1942); Ratner v. City 
of Richmond, 201 N.E.2d 49 (Ind. Ct. App. 1964); Circle Lounge & Grille, Inc. v. Board 
of Appeal, 324 Mass. 427, 86 N.E.2d 920 (1949); Lampinski v. Rhode Island Racing 
&: Athletics Comm'n, 94 R.I. 438, 181 A.2d 438 (1962). But see Jackson's Inc. v. Zoning 
Bd. of Appeals, 21 Conn. Supp. 102, 145 A.2d 241 (C.P. 1958). 
99. Circle Lounge &: Grille, Inc. v. Board of Appeal, 324 Mass. 427, 430, 86 N.E.2d 
920, 922 (1949). 
100. See, e.g., Farr v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 139 Conn. 577, 95 A.2d 792 (1953). 
IOI. See McDermott v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 150 Conn. 510, 191 A.2d 551 (1963); 
Bettman v. Michaelis, 27 Misc. 2d 1010, 212 N.Y.S.2d 339 (Sup. Ct. 1961). 
102. STANDARD Ac-r § 7. See IowA CODE ANN. § 414.15 (1949); PA. STAT, ANN. tit. 53, 
§ 14759 (1957). 
103. Krasnowiecki; supra note 64, at 56. 
104. See id. at 55-56; Comment, Zoning Variances, 74 HARv. L. REv. 1396, 1400 
(1961). 
105. E.g., O'Connor v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 140 Conn. 65, 98 A.2d 515 (1953); 
Mayor v. Byrd, 191 Md. 632, 62 A.2d 588 (1948); Norwood Heights Improvement 
Ass'n v. Mayor, 195 Md. I, 72 A.2d I (1950); see Jackson's Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 
21 Conn. Supp. 102, 106, 145 A.2d 241, 243 (C.P. 1958): "(E]very taxpayer has a certain, 
though it may be a small, pecuniary interest in having the ..• law well administered." 
Cf. Hamelin v. Zoning Bd., 19 Conn. Supp. 445, 117 A.2d 86 (C.P. 1955). 
106. E.g., DeVenne v. City of Lakewood, 95 Ohio L. Abs. 361, 201 N.E.2d 80 (Ct. 
App. 1964) (per curiam); see City of Fairfax v. Shanklin, 205 Va. 227, 135 S.E.2d 773 
(1964). 
107. See Tyler v. Board of ~oning Appeals, 145 Conn. 655, 145 A.2d 832 (1958). 
Most acts also allow for appeals by any officer, board, or bureau of the municipality. 
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E. Associations 
In most jurisdictions a civic, improvement, or property owners' 
association cannot qualify as an aggrieved person.108 Since an asso-
ciation generally does not own property, it cannot meet the "special 
damages" requirement, 109 and a mere interest in strict enforcement 
of zoning regulations for the benefit of the community or the asso-
i:;iation has not been considered an adequate substitute for the 
showing of special damages.110 Moreover, even where a statute spe-
cifically provides that an association or organization may appeal,111 
it is not clear that courts will necessarily grant standing. Although 
there have been no decisions on the issue, it is likely that such 
provisions will be given the same narrow interpretation that has 
been given to provisions allowing "any tax.payer" to have standing. 
If that is so, an association will be forced to meet the stricter require-
ments of an ordinary aggrieved person. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Zoning regulation must be viewed not only as an instrument of 
public policy, but also as a protection, in the long run, against 
infringement of individual property rights. In order to harmonize 
the twin goals of uniformity and individual diversity, it is important 
that persons who have an interest in preserving an established plan 
have an opportunity to be heard when use changes are contem-
plated. For this reason statutory grants of aggrieved party status to 
third parties should be liberally construed. Since it is a matter of 
standing only, litigation on the merits of the complaint should be 
relied upon to expose any frivolous complaints. 
At the same time, it is important that "aggrieved party" status 
be readily available to persons who apply for permits to change land 
STANDARD Acr § 7; S.C. CODE § 47-1014 (1962); VA. CoDE § 15.1-497 (1964). The scope 
of these provisions is not discussed in this comment because officials arc not required 
to be aggrieved persons as well. Sec, e.g., Dupuis v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 152 Conn, 
308, 206 A.2d 422 (1965); Fox: v. Adams, 206 Misc. 236, 132 N.Y.S.2d 560 (Sup, Ct, 
1954). A few cases have allowed appeals by the city as an aggrieved party. Sec City of 
Mobile v. Lee, 274 Ala. 344, 148 So. 2d 642 (1963); City of Glen Cove v. Buxcnbaum, 
17 App. Div. 2d 828, 233 N.Y.S.2d 141 (1962). 
108. E.g., Lido Beach Civic Ass'n v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 13 App. Div. 2d 1030, 
217 N.Y.S.2d 364 (1961). But see KY. REv. STAT, ANN, § 100.872 (1962). 
109. Norwood Heights Improvement Ass'n v. Mayor, 195 Md. 1, 72 A.2d 1 (1950); 
Lindcnwood Improv,::ment Ass'n v. Lawrence, 278 S.W.2d 30 (Mo, Ct, App. 1955); 
Feldman v. Nassau Shores Estates, Inc., 12 Misc, 2d 607, 172 N.Y.S.2d 769 (Sup. Ct. 1958). 
But cf. Tax:payers' Ass'n v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 301 N.Y. 215, 93 N.E,2d 645 
(1950). 
110. See Property Owners Ass'n v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 2 Misc, 2d 309, 123 
N.Y.S.2d 716 (Sup. Ct. 1953); Tyler v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 145 Conn, 655, 145 
A.2d 832 (1958). A pet"..on may not become aggrieved merely by assuming "the role 
of champion of a community." Blumberg v, Hill, 119 N.Y.S.2d 855, 857 (Sup, Ct, 1953), 
111. E.g., KY, REv. STAT, ANN. § 100.872 (1962). 
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use. The reasonableness of any denial of a variance can be e_xamined 
by the board or the courts, but the requirement of standing should 
not be employed to inhibit expression of views. If a person can 
demonstrate that he possesses a substantial economic interest in the 
outcome of the variance proceeding, he should be accorded standing 
for purposes of appeal regardless of the nature of his legal interest 
in the affected property. 
Alfred V. Boerner 
